David K. Levine
David K. Levine | |
---|---|
Born | David Knudsen Levine c. 1955 (age 68–69) |
Nationality | American |
Education | University of California, Los Angeles (BA, MA) Massachusetts Institute of Technology (PhD) |
Academic career | |
Field | Game theory, General equilibrium Theory |
Institution | University of California, Los Angeles Washington University in St. Louis European University Institute Royal Holloway, University of London |
Doctoral advisor | Peter Diamond[1] |
Doctoral students | Guido Tabellini |
Contributions | Learning in games, Folk theorem |
Information at IDEAS / RePEc | |
David Knudsen Levine (born c. 1955) is an American economist. He is the Leverhulme International Professor of Economics at Royal Holloway, University of London; Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Study Joint Chair at the European University Institute; and the John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor of Economics Emeritus at Washington University in St. Louis. He previously taught at UCLA where he held the Armen Alchian Chair in Economic Theory and twice served as Chair of the Department.[2] His research includes the study of intellectual property and endogenous growth in dynamic general equilibrium models, the endogenous formation of preferences, social norms and institutions, learning in games, and game theory applications to experimental economics.
Biography
At UCLA, Levine obtained a B.A. in mathematics in 1977, and an M.A. in economics in the same year. He was awarded a Ph.D. in economics at MIT in June 1981. He became an assistant professor of economics at UCLA in July 1981, an associate professor of economics at the University of Minnesota in 1987, and a professor of economics at UCLA in the same year. In 1997 he became the Armen Alchian Professor of Economics at UCLA. In 2006, he moved to Washington University in St. Louis, where he became the John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor of Economics. In 2023, he became the Leverhulme International Professor of Economics at Royal Holloway, University of London. [3]
Levine was the coeditor of the Review of Economic Dynamics from November 1996 to June 2001, and of Econometrica from July 2003 to June 2008. He presided the Society for Economic Dynamics from July 2006 to June 2009.
Levine is a Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1989 and a research associate at NBER since 2006.
Research
David K. Levine conducts ongoing research in general equilibrium theory, focusing specifically on growth theory, innovation, and intellectual property. Collaborating with Michele Boldrin, Levine examines the role of increasing returns in growth and innovation. They posit that little evidence exists for increasing returns at the aggregate level, and thus argue that there is no reason to believe that increasing returns play an important role in growth. This theory concludes that existing claims for the necessity of intellectual property in the process of growth and innovation are greatly exaggerated.
Levine also conducts research in the field of dynamic games. He established with Drew Fudenberg that a long-lived player playing in opposition to short-lived players can substitute reputation for commitment. He developed with Eric Maskin the first "folk theorem" for games in which players do not directly observe each other's decisions, with applications for learning in games. They argued that while learning theories cannot provide detailed descriptions of non-equilibrium behavior, they act as a useful tool in understanding which equilibria are likely to emerge. One example of this, they put forward, explains how superstitions survive in the face of rational learning.
Levine currently studies the endogenous formation of preferences and social norms. His analysis of experimental anomalies explores some of the limitations of the standard economic model of self-interested individuals.
Publications
- The Theory of Learning in Games, co-author with Drew Fudenberg
- Against Intellectual Monopoly, co-author with Michele Boldrin
Working papers
- http://www.dklevine.com/papers.htm
Podcast
- http://www.dklevine.com/podcasts.xml
References
External links
- Economic and Game Theory, by David K. Levine
- Against Monopoly: Defending the Right to Innovate
- Freshmeat account, author of cross-platform UNIX software
- Copyright Controversies: Freedom, Property, Content Creation, and the DMCA, a Cato Institute conference at which Levine spoke.
- Against Intellectual Property lecture Archived 2011-10-05 at the Wayback Machine, a recording of a free public lecture by David Levine at Simon Fraser University.
- Levine's academic CV
- v
- t
- e
- Congestion game
- Cooperative game
- Determinacy
- Escalation of commitment
- Extensive-form game
- First-player and second-player win
- Game complexity
- Graphical game
- Hierarchy of beliefs
- Information set
- Normal-form game
- Preference
- Sequential game
- Simultaneous game
- Simultaneous action selection
- Solved game
- Succinct game
- Mechanism design
concepts
- Bayes correlated equilibrium
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Berge equilibrium
- Core
- Correlated equilibrium
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
- Epsilon-equilibrium
- Evolutionarily stable strategy
- Gibbs equilibrium
- Mertens-stable equilibrium
- Markov perfect equilibrium
- Nash equilibrium
- Pareto efficiency
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Proper equilibrium
- Quantal response equilibrium
- Quasi-perfect equilibrium
- Risk dominance
- Satisfaction equilibrium
- Self-confirming equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium
- Shapley value
- Strong Nash equilibrium
- Subgame perfection
- Trembling hand equilibrium
of games
- Go
- Chess
- Infinite chess
- Checkers
- All-pay auction
- Prisoner's dilemma
- Gift-exchange game
- Optional prisoner's dilemma
- Traveler's dilemma
- Coordination game
- Chicken
- Centipede game
- Lewis signaling game
- Volunteer's dilemma
- Dollar auction
- Battle of the sexes
- Stag hunt
- Matching pennies
- Ultimatum game
- Electronic mail game
- Rock paper scissors
- Pirate game
- Dictator game
- Public goods game
- Blotto game
- War of attrition
- El Farol Bar problem
- Fair division
- Fair cake-cutting
- Bertrand competition
- Cournot competition
- Stackelberg competition
- Deadlock
- Diner's dilemma
- Guess 2/3 of the average
- Kuhn poker
- Nash bargaining game
- Induction puzzles
- Trust game
- Princess and monster game
- Rendezvous problem
- Aumann's agreement theorem
- Folk theorem
- Minimax theorem
- Nash's theorem
- Negamax theorem
- Purification theorem
- Revelation principle
- Sprague–Grundy theorem
- Zermelo's theorem
figures
- Albert W. Tucker
- Amos Tversky
- Antoine Augustin Cournot
- Ariel Rubinstein
- Claude Shannon
- Daniel Kahneman
- David K. Levine
- David M. Kreps
- Donald B. Gillies
- Drew Fudenberg
- Eric Maskin
- Harold W. Kuhn
- Herbert Simon
- Hervé Moulin
- John Conway
- Jean Tirole
- Jean-François Mertens
- Jennifer Tour Chayes
- John Harsanyi
- John Maynard Smith
- John Nash
- John von Neumann
- Kenneth Arrow
- Kenneth Binmore
- Leonid Hurwicz
- Lloyd Shapley
- Melvin Dresher
- Merrill M. Flood
- Olga Bondareva
- Oskar Morgenstern
- Paul Milgrom
- Peyton Young
- Reinhard Selten
- Robert Axelrod
- Robert Aumann
- Robert B. Wilson
- Roger Myerson
- Samuel Bowles
- Suzanne Scotchmer
- Thomas Schelling
- William Vickrey